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ABSTRACT
Startups desperately need funding. But lending to startups is too risky
for banks. How can banks lend to startups whose cash flow is negative,
tangible assets are nonexistent, and most valuable assets are patents? In
light of the uncertainties, what can banks do in lending for innovations? In
this Article, we turn to economic theory to demonstrate how banks can make
their selections of startups, ensuring their returns and encouraging
innovations. Specifically, we create a signaling model with partial
separating equilibria to demonstrate how banks can address the information
asymmetry problem by relying on a truth-telling signal in assessing the
likelihood a startup firm will obtain subsequent rounds of capital funding.
The model is consistent with evidence from publicly available sources.
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INTRODUCTION
The US Patent and Trademark Office released its latest Intellectual
Property and U.S. Economy report, emphasizing how patent-intensive
O2V)+*,OU+ W12*,Oo)*U *1 *PU 2p*O12:+ UW1214OW Q,1m*Pd 1 By USPTO
indications which incorporate findings from other studies, revenue specific
to the licensing of intellectual property rights totaled $115.2 billion in 2012. 2
With respect to employment, the IP-intensive industries directly accounted
R1, p2V O2VO,UW*Lj +)..1,*UV HGdG 4OLLO12 N1o+ 1, *PO,*j .U,WU2* 1R *PU 2p*O12:+
employment.3 It is undeniable that intellectual property, namely, patents,
copyrights, and trademarks, are valuable corporate assets and important to
the engine of growth and employment.
Companies, small or large, private or public, acquire patents organically

1. Economics & Statistics Administration and U.S. Patent and Trademarks Office,
Intellectual Property and the U.S. Economy: 2016 Update, https://www.uspto.gov/sites/defa
ult/files/documents/IPandtheUSEconomySept2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/8JFT-4CTM].
2. Id. at 26.
3. Id. at 13.
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in-house4 or inorganically through purchase5 and license deals.6 Some
startups with valuation above one billion dollars stockpile patents for
defensive purposes before they go public. 7 Established companies
accumulate patents for direct investments and corporate strategies. 8
Acquiring patents from others can require large sums of money. The sale of

4. For example, in the cryptocurrency area, companies, such as Goldman Sachs, not
known for seeking patents was granted its SETLcoin cryptocurrency patent. While AT&T,
not known in the bitcoin industry, was also awarded a patent for a bitcoin-powered subscriber
server. See Chuan Tian, The Rate of Blockchain Patent Applications Has Nearly Doubled in
2017, COINDESK (Jul 27, 2017, 5:03 PM), https://www.coindesk.com/rate-blockchain-patentapplications-nearly-doubled-2017/ [https://perma.cc/5N77-6T8B] (noting that there was a
ninety percent increase in patent applications relating broadly to blockchain technology from
2016-2017).
5. See, e.g., Steve Lohr, Microsoft’s AOL Deal Intensifies Patent Wars, NEW YORK
TIMES, (Apr. 9, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/10/technology/microsoft-to-buyaol-patents-for-more-than-1-billion.html [https://perma.cc/9DUF-NML7] (commenting on
Microsoft:s purchase of 800 patents from AOL for more than $1 billion as another example
of patents as “valued assets and feared weapons” that “companies are battling in the
marketplace and in courtrooms around the world, where patent claims and counterclaims are
filed almost daily”).
6. Regarding the importance of patent licensing, companies in the “Internet of Things”
space look to patent license packages as an answer to avoid the patent war experienced by the
smartphone industry. See Kennie Ho, 4 Things You Need to Know About the Impending
Internet-of-Things Patent Wars, FINNEGAN, (May 16, 2016), https://www.finnegan.com/en/i
nsights/4-things-you-need-to-know-about-the-impending-internet-of-things.html
[https://perma.cc/QMP6-7K2W] (drawing lessons from the Smartphone patent wars for
companies operating in the IoT industries).
7. See Charles Arthur, Facebook Buys 750 IBM Patents: But Why Does It Need to Fight
Yahoo?, THE GUARDIAN, (Mar. 23, 2012, 11:51 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technolo
gy/2012/mar/23/yahoo-facebook-patents [https://perma.cc/7UD7-2ZVV] (noting that
Facebook “prepares a war chest” of patents which are “essential tool in any sizable company:s
defences” and that patent portfolio is an “essential weapon for any company as it grows”); see
also Industry Report & Billion Dollar Start-Ups: Do Unicorns Like Patents, IAM, (Sept. 2,
2015), http://www.iam-media.com/industryreports/detail.aspx?g=346fef38-7aba-481c-abcb01f17f0497ce [https://perma.cc/AU5Z-KCNN] (reporting that some young companies with
billion dollar valuation but fewer patents than “established competitors, many of which will
be considering how to slow...down” the unicorns, must “boost their patent holdings through
acquisition.”); Efrat Kasznik, The Role of Intellectual Property in Unicorn Valuations, THE
BUS. JOURNALS, (Nov. 4. 2015), https://www.bizjournals.com/bizjournals/how-to/funding/20
15/11/role-of-intellectual-property-in-unicorn-valuation.html [https://perma.cc/3YZ8-SJJE]
(analyzing patent portfolios of young companies with high valuations and noting
vulnerabilities without having strong patent portfolios); For a list of unicorn companies, see
also The Global Unicorn Club, CBINSIGHTS, https://www.cbinsights.com/research-unicorncompanies [https://perma.cc/TY45-YCNF].
8. See Antonio Regalado, Google’s Growing Patent Stockpile, MIT TECH. REV., (Nov.
29, 2013), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/521946/googles-growing-patent-stockpile/
[https://perma.cc/9C6N-GGRL] (studying Google:s patent acquisition behavior that drove the
company to create “an arsenal so big that others would be afraid to sue, lest Google would
sue back”).
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Y1*1,1Lp Y1oOLO*j:+ p2V X1,*UL:+ .p*U2* .1,*R1LO1+ WLUp,Lj +U*+ p 2Um
+*p2Vp,V R1, 4)L*OoOLLO12 V1LLp, VUpL+f o)* “+4pLLU,” P)2V,UV+ 1R 4OLLO12
dollar deals are also becoming common. 9 The patent market and
monetization today are global in scope. 10 To fuel the patent market, more
than three million patent applications were filed with patent offices globally
during 2016, representing the seventh straight year of patent filing increase.
Outside the U.S. b1,VU,+f !PO2p:+ *1*pL .p*U2* p..LOWp*O12 ROLO2Q O+ Q,Up*U,
than the filings in the United States, Japan, South Korea and Europe
combined.11 In the US, patent application filings for fiscal year 2016
exceeded 650,000 while the USPTO issued 347,642 new patents and
monitored 1,144,304 pending patent applications in 2017. 12
Given the vast number of patents and patent applications available and
strong indications that patents are valuable as corporate assets, why do banks
refuse to lend against patents? As we have documented in our companion
paper, banks have a strong aversion to patents and are wary of lending to
innovative startups due to default risks. 13 In this Article, we focus on how
banks can efficiently identify high-quality eligible startups in order to
minimize risks. We seek to answer what signals banks rely on to make their

9. See David Cohen, A Look at Facebook’s Patent Acquisitions, ADWEEK (September
3, 2014), http://www.adweek.com/digital/envision-ip-patent-acquisitions/ [https://perma.cc/
GA6S-CJWY] (listing patent acquisitions by Facebook that emphasize sales of patents within
the price range of hundreds of millions of dollars); Cadie Thompson, Facebook buys
Microsoft Patents for $550 Million, CNBC, (April 23, 2012, 2:15 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/
id/47144621 [https://perma.cc/4HES-PGR8] (detailing Facebook:s purchase of 650 patents
from Microsoft for $550 million in cash).
10. See, e.g., Gene Quinn, Bullish or Bearish on the 2018 Patent Market?,
IPWATCHDOG, (Nov. 5, 2017), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/11/05/bullish-bearish-20
18-patent-market/id=89498/ [https://perma.cc/T2G5-XFH5] (reporting that the patent market
in 2018 will be “bullish” because of “jobs and China,” as China has been doing the exact
opposite of the United States when it comes to patents. “It is investing heavily in patents, and
its patent system and is creating a serious venue for patent holders to enforce their rights. In
fact, in many respects, China now takes patent protection more seriously than the United
States. I think the implications of this, as well as the serious inability of American companies
to protect their technologies at home, particularly in light of foreign competition, is going to
impact Congressional thinking on patent issues for the better.”
11. Steve Brachmann, WIPO Stats on Patent Application Filings Shows China
Continuing to Lead the World, IPWATCHDOG, (Dec. 12, 2017), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/
2017/12/12/wipo-stats-patent-application-filings-china-lead/id=90855/ [https://perma.cc/N7
KM-XZRY].
12. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Performance and Accountability Report 2017,
170-74, https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/USPTOFY17PAR.pdf [https://
perma.cc/KTX5-7MP2].
13. See Xuan-Thao Nguyen and Erik Hille, Patent Aversion: An Empirical Study of Bank
Financing with Patent Collateral, 1980-2016 9 UC Irvine L. Rev. 141 (2018); Xuan-Thao
Nguyen and Erik Hille, IP Venture Banking: Disrupting Tech Lending with Warrants and
Collateral (on file with the authors).
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lending decisions in the innovation economy sectors. Because the
O221(p*O12 UW1214j +UW*1,+ p,U mPU,U 8U2*),U !p.O*pL h“8!”g RO,4+ 1.U,p*U
and the majority of banks dare not treadf +*p,*).+ Pp(U LO**LU pWWU++ *1 op2M:+
cheap loans. Our economic model aims to disrupt the barrier faced by the
startups.
Our Article is the first to provide a model based on economic theory of
separating equilibrium in venture lending by banks. The model illustrates
P1m *PU O2R1,4p*O12 p+j44U*,j .,1oLU4 ,ULp*UV *1 op2M+: (U2*),U LU2VO2Q
can be resolved through a partial separating equilibrium created by a
credible, truth-telling, and costly effort signal, which indicates the current
health and outlook of a potential startup client. That means banks will
depend on credible indicators of the likelihood that the startup that has
already obtained Series A funding will be able to receive subsequent VC
rounds. It is these subsequent rounds that provide the capital to repay the
bank loan. 14 =PU 41VUL VU412+*,p*U+ *Pp* *PU U2*,U.,U2U),:+ W1+*Lj URR1,*+
beyond the fundraising all startups must do are credible signals for banks to
rely on in screening startups for venture loans.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides the background and
impetus for our economic model of how banks should solve information
asymmetry in order to lend to winning startups. Part I explains how outlier
banks have managed risks associated with tech lending to startups by
creati2Q p )2O-)U o)+O2U++ +1L)*O12 *Pp* mU W1O2UV “]@ 8U2*),U "p2MO2Q”d
With the insights from IP Venture Banking, we turn to economics theory to
create our model.
Part II looks to the agency model and terms of contract model in VC
funding to startups in an at*U4.* *1 V,pm LU++12+ R1, 1)*LOU, op2M+: +1L(O2Q
information asymmetry problems in making their venture lending decisions.
Despite some similarities, the solutions to VCs are not applicable to banks.
Part III goes beyond the economics framework in Part II by canvasing
existing studies related to signaling mechanisms in VC and venture debt
RO2p2WO2Q mO*P .p*U2*+ p+ W1LLp*U,pLd ]2 1*PU, m1,V+f @p,* ]]] +Up,WPU+ R1, “*PU
4O++O2Q W,UVOoLU +OQ2pL+” *Pp* O+ *,)*P-telling incentive compatibility in
outlier bank lending to innovative startups. No such models exist in the
literature but the review is helpful in constructing our model.
Before we delve into our model of credible signals, Part IV explains the
background of signaling separating equilibrium theory. Scholars have
applied the theory and created models in different situations to solve
information asymmetry problems. In Part V, we demonstrate our economic
14. Derek Ridgley, Credit Insights: The Ins And Outs Of Raising Venture Debt, SVB,
(January 16, 2018), https://www.svb.com/blogs/derek-ridgley/credit-insights-the-ins-and-out
s-of-raising-venture-debt/ [https://perma.cc/AHN2-NRYB] (subsequent venture equity is the
primary source of loan repayment).
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theory through the modeling of costly effort partial separating signal.
Essentially, the model reveals how outlier banks reduce information
asymmetry problems by relying on a costly truth-telling signal T the effort
of the entrepreneur to secure extra unnecessary VC participants in the next
rounds of capital funding from high quality outside VCs.
Part VI shows that our theoretical economic modeling has real world
evidence. We explain and examine the observable practices of outlier banks,
Silicon Valley Bank and Comerica Bank, specifically, how they actually
make lending decisions to startups and reap benefits from the warrants to
acquire stock in the startup.
The Article ends with a conclusion that it is time for banks to reconsider
their refusal to lend to startups. We want to encourage banks across the
nation to engage in the innovation economy sectors where startups are
desperate for loans in between VC funding rounds. In return, banks can
realize benefits by unlocking patents and other intellectual property assets as
key drivers of the enterprise through obtaining warrants as part of the loan
cost.15 In the end, banks lend to innovators while embracing a new lending
model that benefits both the lenders and the borrowers.
IMPETUS AND INSIGHTS FROM IP VENTURE BANKING
A. The Knot in Bank Lending to Startups
Banks operate within a heavily regulated industry under both state and
federal regimes.16 Due to the regulatory constraints in banking, banks must
be prudent in its lending practices. Under lending regulations, banks are very
reluctant to lend to startups due to high levels of risk. 17 These startups
15. Our future research will focus on outlier banks and later-stage growth companies,
including post IPO companies. We will also conduct a case study of specific IP Venture
Banks. Additionally, we will investigate IP enhancement in venture banking.
16. The FDIC and the Banking Industry: Perspective and Outlook, (Jan. 19, 2018),
https://www.fdic.gov/about/strategic/strategic/bankingindustry.html
[https://perma.cc/D5K6-GJAQ] (explaining that the FDIC is the primary federal regulator of
federally insured state-chartered banks that are not members of the Federal Reserve System.);
Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Expansion of State Bank Powers, the Federal Response, and the
Case for Preserving the Dual Banking System, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 1133, 1152-54 (1990)
(detailing the history of the dual banking, federal and state, system in the United States).
17. Warren Lee, 7 Reasons Banks Not Lending to Small Businesses, THE LENDING MAG,
(Nov. 13, 2015), https://thelendingmag.com/banks-not-lending-to-small-business/ [https://pe
rma.cc/R6LX-W2XN] (asserting thatB “heightened regulation standards have caused banks to
be extra-careful about the risk in their investment portfolios and drastically tighten up
standards. . . . Unfortunately, small businesses are inherently riskier than huge corporations,
which makes banks hesitant about extending credit to them. Moreover, banks require physical
property as collateral. This makes it hard for startups and new businesses that may not have
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typically have no cash flow, no tangible assets, and no products in the
marketplace.18
The few banks that do lend to startups cannot lend to just any startup. 19
With startups that have procured a few patents, banks exhibit strong aversion
to lending against patents.20 Reasons include the lack of reliable valuation
methodology and readily available markets, as patents are illiquid and risky
collateral.21 AL+1f )2VU, op2MO2Q ,UQ)Lp*O12+f “,UpVOLj 4p,MU*poLU W1LLp*U,pL”
does not cover patents and other intellectual property assets.22 Even with the
real estate or valuable equipment to offer as collateral, and small business owners may be
uncomfortable using their personal assets (family homes and automobiles) as business loan
collateral.”).
18. Martin Zwilling, 10 Ways For Startups To Survive The Valley Of Death, FORBES,
(Feb. 18, 2013, 11:30PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/martinzwilling/2013/02/18/10-ways
-for-startups-to-survive-the-valley-of-death/#569bc24469ef [https://perma.cc/V8PA-DF3H]
(describing the difficulty of covering the negative cash flow in early stages of a startup as the
“valley of death”). “Companies that reach highly competitive Series A rounds typically have
systematically reduced their company:s product, market and execution risk during the seed
stage. The founders of these companies use their seed capital to efficiently orchestrate a
process-oriented set of experiments that culminate in evidence of product-market fit.”
Nnamdi Okike, Charting a Path from Seed to a Competitive Series A Round, TECHCRUCH,
(May 7, 2015),
19. Banks make their decisions to lend to only startups that have the “ability to raise
additional capital to fund growth and repay the debt.” Derek Ridgley, Extend Your Startup’s
Runway: How Venture Debt Works, SVB, (October 13, 2016), https://www.svb.com/Blogs/D
erek_Ridgley/Extend_your_startup_s_runway__How_venture_debt_works [https://perma.
cc/EW2V-K3H9].
20. Without access to traditional loans from banks, IP-centric companies gravitate to
alternative or specialty lenders for loans against IP. Nevertheless, in the alternative space,
“valuations are a critical step in the process of lending against IP.” Bruce W. Burton, et. al.,
Financing Alternatives for Companies: Using Intellectual Property as Collateral, SRR,
(2014), https://www.innovasafe.com/pdf/financing-alternatives-companiesusing-ip-collater
al.pdf [https://perma.cc/5EN9-Y4WL].
21. Id. (noting that loans provided by specialty lenders against banks are “costly” because
IP assets are illiquid and risky collateral). For a discussion on numerous methods of patent
valuations and their associated concerns, see Krista F. Holt, et. al., What’s It Worth?
Principles of Patent Valuation, ABA SECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW,
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/landslide/2015-septemberoctober/ABA_LAND_v008n01__whats_it_worth_principles_of_patent_valuation.authchec
kdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/LUT3-WCLM]; J. Timothy Cromley, 20 Steps for Pricing a
Patent, J. OF ACCOUNTANCY, (Nov. 1, 2004), https://www.journalofaccountancy.com/issues/
2004/nov/20stepsforpricingapatent.html [https://perma.cc/73YA-UBLV].
22. 12 C.F.R. § 32.2(v) (2015) provides that “readily marketable collateral” means
“financial instruments and bullion that are salable under ordinary market conditions with
reasonable promptness at a fair market value determined by quotations based upon actual
transactions on an auction or similarly available daily bid and ask price market.” The term
“financial instrument” is further defined in 12 C.F.R. § 32.2(p) (2015) as followsB “Financial
instrument means stocks, notes, bonds, and debentures traded on a national securities
exchange, OTC margin stocks as defined in Regulation U, 12 CFR part 221, commercial
paper, negotiable certificates of deposit, bankers: acceptances, and shares in money market
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fortunate few startups that have received VC funding, banks are still very
cautious.23 The survival rate for startups between Series A round of funding
obtained from VCs to the next Series B round of funding is about fifty
percent.24 That means for banks to succeed in the venture lending niche, they
need reliable signals to screen the startups that will be able to pay back the
loans.
B. Warrants as Enterprise Value of Intellectual Property
In creating a model on signaling mechanism, we take advantage of our
companion paper where we have identified the outlier banks that make loans
to startups whose intellectual property assets are key drivers of the enterprise
value.25 Out of 6,000 banks, only a small number of banks have created a
unique business model of tech lending to the entrepreneurial startup
economy based on the enterprise value of the intellectual property owned by
the startups.26 =Pp* 4Up2+ mPU2 *PU +*p,*).:+ U2*U,.,O+U (pL)U U2N1j+ POQPU,
valuation at a later acquisition or possible IPO, the bank also obtains benefits
from the high valuation. 27 Accordingly, the banks demand warrants to
purchase stock in the startup as part of the venture loan cost. 28
and mutual funds of the type that issue shares in which national banks or savings associations
may perfect a security interest. Financial instruments may be denominated in foreign
currencies that are freely convertible to U.S. dollars.” The term “financial instrument” does
not include mortgages.
23. Banks generally lend to established companies with tangible assets, not patents. See
Bank of America Merrill Lynch White Paper, Frequently Asked Questions About Asset-Based
Lending, (Jan. 2014), http://www.ohiomfg.com/wp-content/uploads/01-13-17_lb_tax_FAQAsset-Based-Lending.pdf [https://perma.cc/JYM4-MTFT].
24. See Jason D. Rowley, The Startup Funding Graduation Rate is Surprisingly Low,
MATTERMARK (Sept. 28, 2016), https://mattermark.com/startup-graduation-rate-surprisinglylow/ [https://perma.cc/7H2E-DAPA] (finding that startup matriculation rates for 2009-2012
is 31.7% for Series A, 17% for Series B, 7.4% for Series C, 2.4% for Series D, 1% for Series
E, and 0.3% for Series F). For an explanation of what Series funding by VCs mean, see
Shoshanna Delventhal, Series A, B, C Funding: How It Works, INVESTOPEDIA, (Dec. 29,
2017), https://www.investopedia.com/articles/personal-finance/102015/series-b-c-fundingwhat-it-all-means-and-how-it-works.asp [https://perma.cc/K6GZ-Q6WV].
25. See Xuan-Thao Nguyen and Erik Hille, IP Venture Banking: Disrupting Tech
Lending with Warrants and Collateral (on file with the authors).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Andy Weyer of Square 1 Bank provided the following financial covenants and
pricing for venture loan by banks:
Most venture banks require financial covenants (e.g., minimum revenue at 75% plan,
maximum net loss at 125% plan or minimum equity raise by a certain date), but the overall
cost of capital is relatively low (interest rates at 4%-8%, upfront fees at 0.25%-0.50% and
warrants at 3%-5%).
Andy Weyer, Typical Venture Debt Terms, SQUARE 1 BANK, (Feb. 24, 2014),
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A warrant is a derivative that confers the right to buy a certain amount
of shares in the startup at a fixed low price. 29 An outlier bank can demand a
warrant of less than a 0.5 percent share in the company. 30 The bank can cash
in on the warrant any time before the expiration date. 31 Obviously, the bank
holds on to the warrant and redeems it at the most opportune time.
Illustratively, ComericA bank received a warrant to purchase 233,333 shares
of Celator Pharmaceuticals, Inc. at $0.60 per share on March 11, 2009.32 The
expiration date for the warrant was March 11, 2016.33 By May 2016, Jazz
Pharmaceuticals PLC offered to acquire Celator for $1.5 billion or $30.25 a
share.34 The warrant became an attractive return on the loan for the bank.
Another example on the benefits of warrant to outlier banks is Silicon
VallUj "p2M h>8"gd ]2 *PU +UW12V -)p,*U, R1, JbKG pL12Uf >8":+ QpO2 12
the equity warrants was $23.6 million. 35 That amount included $13.9 million
,ULp*UV *1 `O*"O*:+ ]@Ad `O*"O* O+ *PU 4pMU, 1R RO*2U++-tracking wristbands. 36
The gains on the second quarter for 2015 alone exceeded all the losses SVB
bank incurred in the preceding ten years.37
The bank also takes a security interest in the patents just in case the
startup fails.38 Comparing the warrant to the security interest in the patents,
the warrant has a much more valuable upside. 39 The banks rely on the
https://www.square1bank.com/insights/typical-venture-debt-terms/ [https://perma.cc/EP2FSWDN]. A sample warrant from Square 1 Bank is available at http://contracts.onecle.com/
otonomy/square-one-warrant-2012-07-31.shtml [https://perma.cc/N8N8-3L2H].
29. A warrant is a derivative that confers the right, but not the obligation, to buy or sell a
security – normally an equity – at a certain price before expiration. See Warrant, INVESTOPE
DIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/w/warrant.asp#ixzz55PvKWdUr [https://perma.cc
/CT55-SQNZ].
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Comerica Bank Warrant, https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1327467/00011
9312512517529/d411577dex43.htm [https://perma.cc/JJ6S-AVD3] (last visited Sept. 17, 20
18).
33. Id.
34. Cory Renauer, Why Celator Pharmaceuticals Is Up 1,610% in 2016, THE MOTLEY
FOOL, (June 27, 2016, 8:21AM), https://www.fool.com/investing/2016/06/27/why-celatorpharmaceuticals-is-up-1610-in-2016.aspx [https://perma.cc/XW3A-GHM9].
35. See E. Scott Reckard, At Silicon Valley Bank, Risky Tech Start-ups Are Lucrative
Business, L.A. TIMES, (Aug. 8, 2015) (reporting on SVB:s warrants holding).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Secured transactions allow banks to repossess the patent collateral and sell the patents
to others to recover the loan. Illustratively, SVB bank took a security in patents when it made
a loan to Ozro. A year and half later, Ozro was in financial trouble and the bank sold its
security interest rights in the patents to XACP. As anticipated, Ozro defaulted on the loan
and XACP foreclosed on the patents and sold them at public auction. See Sky Techs. LLC v.
SAP AG, 576 F.3d 1374, 1376-78 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
39. Comerica:s holding on to the warrants in Celator Pharmaceuticals yielded better
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warrants for a substantial profit at a subsequent enterprise valuation date –
VC funding round, acquisition, or initial public offering (IPO). 40 The
business model employed by outlier banks is what we call “]@ 8U2*),U
"p2MO2Qd” 41 With these insights from outlier banks, we turn to economics
theories and signaling models.
LENDER:S DECISION AND INFORMATION ASYMMETRY
Information asymmetry is a familiar problem banks encounter when
they decide to lend to entrepreneurial firms.42 In an information asymmetry
situation, one party has all the information while the other party does not. 43
returns than SVB:s loan and security interest in Ozro. See Warrant, supra note Error!
Bookmark not defined., and compare SVB:s security interest in Ozro, supra note Error!
Bookmark not defined. with Comerica:s Bank Warrant, supra note Error! Bookmark not
defined..
40. Id. (comparing SVB:s security interest in Ozro, supra note Error! Bookmark not
defined. with Comerica:s Bank Warrant, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., the
warrant is the more valuable source of bank profits); Ridgley, supra note Error! Bookmark
not defined. (question 11, states that the low interest rates charged does not cover the
appropriate risk-adjusted interest, thus it is the warrants that are the potential upside for the
lender).
41. SVB, Square 1 and ComericA are examples of banks engaging in IP Venture
Banking. See Resources for Innovators, COMERICA BANK, https://www.comerica.com/busine
ss/industry-solutions/specialized-industries/technology-life-sciences.html
[https://perma.cc/93NU-LZFG]; Your Next Stage Starts Here, SQUARE 1 BANK,
https://www.square1bank.com/ [https://perma.cc/SR4J-HG7U]; Facts at a Glance, SVB,
https://www.svb.com/newsroom/facts-at-a-glance/
[https://perma.cc/PH7L-NX2Q]
(describing each banks venture debt lending practices to startups that we are calling “IP
Venture Banking” when there is a security interest/lien or negative pledge of the startups IP).
For a futher descrption of SVB:s venture debt services see Ridgley, supra note Error!
Bookmark not defined.; Ridgley, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.; Shane
Anderson, The Role Of Venture Debt In A Booming Tech Market, SVB, (October 9, 2018),
https://www.svb.com/blogs/shane-anderson/the-role-of-venture-debt-in-a-booming-techmarket/ [https://perma.cc/H9A6-M74T].
42. See Abraham J.B. Cable, Fending for Themselves: Why Securities Regulations
Should Encourage Angel Groups, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 107, 122 (2010) (“<Information
asymmetry: refers to the concept that whatever information is available about the company:s
prospects at the time of the investment is <soft: (not easily observable by an investor and
difficult for an entrepreneur to communicate credibly).”).
43. Examples of information asymmetry are plenty. A common example is the informed
seller and uninformed buyer. Contingent payments may act as “a screening device to assist
sellers to signal their unobservable quality to uninformed buyers.” Brian JM Quinn, Putting
Your Money Where Your Mouth Is: The Performance of Earnouts in Corporate Acquisitions,
81 U. OF CINCINNATI L. REV. 127, 142 (2012). In the context of corporate acquisitions, “price
contingent on future performance T such as an earnout provision T that both provides
investment incentives and bridges the information asymmetry between the parties.” Albert
Choi & George Triantis, Strategic Vagueness in Contract Design: The Case of Corporate
Acquisitions, 119 YALE L.J. 848, 861 (2010). Information asymmetry, in some cases, are
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In startup financing, the entrepreneurs have all the information about the
+*p,*).:+ *UWP21L1QOU+f O221(p*O12f o)+O2U++ 1.U,p*O12, competition, and
prospects.44 If banks want to lend to the startups, banks are the uninformed
party facing serious information asymmetry problems in screening startups
while having no traditional means to reduce default risks compared to
lending to established companies.45 Because banks can easily obtain
O2R1,4p*O12 ,ULp*O2Q *1 *PU U+*poLO+PUV W14.p2j:+ Wp+P RL1mf Up,2O2Q+f W,UVO*
history, and tangible assets, among others, banks continue their traditional
lending practices.46 Startups simply cannot provide what banks require for a
loan.
In broad strokes, banks with a desire to engage in lending to startups in
the innovation intensive sectors face information asymmetry problems that
are similar to the problems VC financing face. But the solutions to VCs are
different compared to banks, as banks are heavily regulated.
In the VC financing model, the informed entrepreneurs have all the
information and the uninformed investors, including individuals and
institutions, have none. 47 Yuk-See Chan solved the information asymmetry
problem in his agency model by introducing VCs as the informed
intermediaries based on their experience and expertise in the industry,
results of criminal activities. See A.C. Pritchard, Market as Monitors: A Proposal to Replace
Class Actions with Exchanges as Securities Fraud Enforcers, 85 VA. L. REV. 925, 941 (1999)
(“Fraud on the market, therefore, creates information asymmetries between traders. These
information asymmetries mean potential profits for informed traders and corresponding losses
for the uninformed.”).
44. See Cable, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. at 122. “[T]here is an
imbalance of information in favor of the entrepreneur. In the face of information asymmetry,
an investor will have a difficult time distinguishing between good and bad investments and
will discount all the opportunities or price them all as mediocre, thereby raising the cost of
capital for high-quality entrepreneurs.”
45. Id. at 121 (noting that startups are poor candidates for traditional financing from
banks due to lack of positive cash flow and lack of hard assets).
46. Banks typically engage in cash-flow lending and asset-based lending. See Mark N.
Berman and Jo Ann J. Brighton, Handbook on Second Lien Loans & Intercreditor Agreements
6, (American Bankruptcy Institute, 2009). Cash-flow lending is a type of debt financing
typically associated with traditional bank debt financing. It is senior debt financing provided
to a borrower based on a certain multiple of profitability of the borrower deemed sufficient to
give the lender comfort that the borrower will have sufficient cash flow to satisfy its
obligations to the lender. In this regard, the cash flow-lender with a lien on all of the
borrower:s assets is concerned with the overall enterprise value of the borrower as a function
of its earnings. Asset-based lending, in contrast, is where the lender makes its credit decision
on the basis of the appraised value of the borrower:s current assets (receivables, equipment
and inventory) and expects that if the borrower defaults, the value of the assets even in
liquidation will be sufficient to repay the loan.
47. Yuk-Shee Chan, On the Positive Role of Financial Intermediation in Allocation of
Venture Capital in a Market with Imperfect Information, 38 THE JOURNAL OF FINANCE 1543,
1543 (1983).
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enabling them to screen potential investments. 48 Consequently, VCs finance
high quality projects, reject low quality projects, and ensure the integrity and
viability of the entrepreneur funding market. 49 Building on the agency
model, scholars developed new models to focus on terms of contract,
illuminating further what VCs do to screen fledgling entrepreneurs in order
to achieve good investment results. 50 For example, contract terms challenge
U2*,U.,U2U),:+ .,1NUW*O12+ p2V VO+W1),pQU U2*,U.,U2U),+ mO*P L1m-quality
projects from participating in the VC pool of potential capital investment
seekers.51 Contract terms relating to staged venture capital investment allow
VCs to control when to release certain amounts of funding and when to
discontinue.52 Also, contract terms force the entrepreneur to have skin in the
game by tying compensation to specific milestones achieved by the firm,
thus inducing the entrepreneur to reassess himself before seeking capital
investment from VCs.53
In short, both the agency model and the terms of contract model
literature for VC capital investment screenings are numerous and have been
explained and summarized elsewhere. 54 Can banks behave like VCs in
screening borrowers who are startups?
Unlike VCs, banks conduct some due diligence in lending decisions but
not at the same level. 55 Conventional bankers do not spend much time
48. Id. at 1543
49. Id. at 1543
50. For a summary of the literature, see Michael Klausner & Kate Litvak, What
Economists Have Taught Us about Venture Capital Contracting, BRIDGING THE
ENTREPRENEURIAL FINANCING GAP : LINKING GOVERNANCE WITH REGULATORY POLICY,
(Michael Whincop, ed., Ashgate 2001), https://ssrn.com/abstract=280024 or http://dx.doi.org
/10.2139/ssrn.280024 [https://perma.cc/FY2P-KWSS].
51. Mathias Dewatripont & Gerard Roland, Soft Budget Constraints, Transition, and
Financial System, 156 JOURNAL OF INSTITUTIONAL AND THEORETICAL ECONOMICS (JITE)/ZEI
TSCHRIFT FUR DIE GESAMTE S TAATSWISSENSCHAFT 245, 252-53 (1999).
52. Paul A. Gompers & Josh Lerner, Chapter 7, THE VENTURE CAPITAL CYCLE, 168 (MIT
Press 1999).
53. Steven N. Kaplan & Per Stromberg, Venture Capitalists as Principals: Contracting,
Screening, and Monitoring, 91 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW 426, 427 (2001).
54. See Klausner & Litvak, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.; Steven N.
Kaplan & Per Stromberg, Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical
Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts, 70 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES 871, 281-315
(2003); Steven N. Kaplan & Per Stromberg, Characteristics, Contracts, and Actions:
Evidence from Venture Capitalist Analysis, 59 THE JOURNAL OF FINANCE 2177, 2177-2210
(2004).
55. Unlike banks, VCs “perform substantial due diligence on potential investments ex
ante and monitor them very closely ex post” Darian M. Ibrahim, Financing the Next Silicon
Valley, 87 WASH. U. LAW. REV. 717, 730 (2010). With respect to bank due diligence, Risk
Management Association produced a white paper to explain what type of due diligence that
bankers must conduct in commercial lending. Ethics and Commercial Lending:
Understanding Due Diligence, RMA, (July 2014), https://www.rmahq.org/ethics-and-comm
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outside *PU 1RROWU mO*P .1*U2*OpL o1,,1mU,+% *PUj V1 21* +U,(U 12 p +*p,*).:+
board, connect startup with industry leaders, or advise on management. 56 In
other words, bankers are not the same type of financial intermediators as
VCs. Moreover, startups do not have hard assets for traditional bank loans,
meaning there is not much for banks to conduct due diligence on for potential
loans. Banks are less informed intermediaries compared to VCs. Banks are
relatively uninformed parties in screening which startups to lend to.57
On the other hand, banks have access to deposits and cheap capital. 58
As a result, the cost of a loan from banks is significantly less than from
non-bank lenders.59 To minimize agency costs, banks take security interests
ercial-lending-understanding-due-diligence/ [https://perma.cc/28F8-QRLE].
56. VCs, on the other hand, have the skills and connection to be helpful to their portfolio
companies. See George W. Dent, Jr., Venture Capital and the Future of Corporate Finance,
70 WASH. U. L.Q. 1029, 1034 n. 17 (1992) (“Venture capitalists claim that they often provide
general management advice and useful business connections to portfolio companies,
especially when the company needs further financing or wants to go public.”). However,
“[a]lthough venture capitalists have the skill, connections, and possibly the desire to help
portfolio companies, in practice they are too busy to devote sufficient time to be truly helpful.”
Id.
57. Professor Darian M. Ibrahim has identified that there are specialized lenders who
lend to startups by relying on a startup:s VC backing and intellectual property for loan
repayment requirement. These lenders solve the information asymmetry problem. Darian M.
Ibrahim, Debt as Venture Capital, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1169, 1175 (2010).
58. See, e.g., Hilary J. Allen, Let’s Talk About Tax: Fixing Bank Incentives to Sabotage
Stability, 18 FORDHAM J. OF CORP. & FINANCIAL L. 821, 839-40 (2013) (noting that “debt is
rendered cheaper for banks because they have access to deposit insurance (which subsidizes
the cost of “borrowing” from depositors), as well as access to emergency funding from central
banks acting in their capacity as “lender of last resort” (which reduces the risk that banks will
default on their noninsured debt, making that debt cheaper for banks to issue)”); Financial
Crisis Inquiry Commission, The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report, 39 (2011), http://fcicstatic.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-reports/fcic_final_report_full.pdf
[https://perma.cc/T3RM-2XFZ] (“Unlike banks and thrifts with access to deposits,
investment banks relied more on money market funds and other investors for cash;
commercial paper and repo loans were the main sources.”). Banks have greater access to
capital at cheaper rates than payday lenders since banks accept deposits.
59. For example, in the consumer lending market, non-bank lenders charge consumers
250% to 400% interest rate on small loans. See, e.g., Christopher L. Peterson, “Warning:
Predatory Lender” & A Proposal for Candid Predatory Small Loan Ordinances, 69 WASH. &
LEE. L. REV. 893, 906 (2012) (“In many states, payday lenders supported weak legislation that
purported to “regulate” payday lending but actually had little substantive content and
primarily served to legitimize hitherto illegal or even criminal loans. Indeed with average
interest rates of around 400%, payday loans were actually much more expensive than the old
mafia loan sharks that typically charged a relatively mild 250%.”). For small businesses,
seeking loans from alternative lenders means significantly high cost. Andrew L. Wang,
Alternative Lending: Nonbank Business Funding Options, NERDWALLET, (Jun. 27, 2017),
https://www.nerdwallet.com/blog/small-business/small-business-loans-alternative-lending/
[https://perma.cc/55NX-HKMM]. “Most alternative business lenders offer loans with
double-digit, even triple-digit, rates. Why? One reason is that most online lenders also require
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in real and personal property owned by potential borrowers and impose many
W1(U2p2*+ *1 ,U+*,OW* p2 U2*,U.,U2U),:+ VO+W,U*O12+d 60 Banks have long used
contract terms to release loans in increments in accordance with the level of
collateral availability, to retain the right to review new information about the
borrower, and to allow banks flexibility to refuse requests to draw on credit
line or waive events of default.61 Even in the high risk of IP Venture Banking,
banks provide loans to startups at about 1/40th (as a measure of dilution) the
cost of equity financing from a VC. 62
Overall, the agency model and terms of contract model are not suitable
for banks seeking a reliable device to screen startups. In order to maintain a
lower cost in lending to startups in the IP Venture Banking niche and adhere
to banking regulations, banks must acquire the reliable signals about the
health of potential startup clients. Since about half of the startups do not
make it from Series A to Series B funding, it is imperative that banks have
the most up-to-date information. 63 Before banks make a loan to the startup,
banks want to know whether the firm will be able to obtain the next round of
VC funding so it can repay the loan. In other words, banks need a truthtelling signal.
THE MISSING SIGNALS
Startups generally burn cash infusions. 64 They are hungry for equity
and debt financing from investors. 65 Financing for innovation has attracted
shorter loan terms, which mean higher regular payments. Also, the borrowers these lenders
encounter tend to be those that traditional banks deemed too risky to lend to. In setting higher
rates, alternative lenders are baking in the higher likelihood that they:re not going to get paid
back.” Sarita Harbour, Why Online Business Loans Are More Expensive Than Bank Loans,
FUNDERA LEDGER, (Jan. 4, 2017,) https://www.fundera.com/blog/why-online-business-loansare-more-expensive-than-bank-loans [https://perma.cc/HFT6-J26A]. “Online business loans
from alternative lenders cost more for borrowers because they cost more for lenders, too.
Banks simply have access to cheaper money from a couple of different sources. . . . The
money that alternative lenders offer to small business borrowers comes from investors like
venture capital firms, hedge funds, and sometimes even individuals looking for a better return
on their dollar.”
60. George G. Triantis, Financial Contract Design in the World of Venture Capital, 68
THE U. OF CHICAGO L. REV. 305, 305-322 (2001).
61. Id. at 313.
62. Ridgley, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined..
63. See Rowley, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined..
64. See, e.g., EMERGING COMPANIES GUIDE, A RESOURCE FOR PROFESSIONALS AND
ENTREPRENEURS 202-04 (Robert L. Brown & Alan S. Gutterman eds., 2d ed., 2004) (stating
startups have high burn rates or how entrepreneurial startup quickly spends its cash each
month and causes the entrepreneur to fear the length of the startup:s runway or the amount of
time the startup has before it runs out of cash).
65. See also George Deeb, Comparing Equity, Debt and Convertibles for Startup
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many scholars to apply and construct theoretical frameworks, resolving
informational asymmetries through identifying signals for VCs to screen
startups for investments. 66 No existing scholarship, however, focuses on
how banks consider their venture lending to startups after Series A. 67 None
provide an economics modeling of bank lending to startups. Nevertheless,
existing scholarship is helpful in thinking, applying, and modifying our
economics model.
A. Patents as Signals in VC Funding to Startups
Many scholars have shown that patent filings by startups are signals for
VCs to decide on investing in startups. 68 Other scholars have narrowed the
Financings, FORBES, (Mar 19, 2014), https://www.forbes.com/sites/georgedeeb/2014/03/19/
comparing-equity-vs-debt-vs-convertibles-for-startup-financings/#23d052f069ff
[https://perma.cc/H4BC-RQSR] (explaining different types of financing for startups, along
with advantages and disadvantages for each type).
66. See generally Joel A.C. Baum & Brian S. Silverman, Picking Winners or Building
Them? Alliance, Intellectual, and Human Capital as Selection Criteria in Venture Financing
and Performance of Biotechnology Startups, 19 JOURNAL OF BUSINESS VENTURING 411-36
(2004); Dirk Engel and Max Keilbach, Firm-level Implications of Early Stage Venture Capital
Investment an Empirical Investigation, 14 JOURNAL OF EMPIRICAL FINANCE 150-67 (2007).
Others rely on financial contract design such as staged investments to screen out bad
applicant. Kate Litvak, Monte Carlo Simulation of Contractual Provisions: An Application
to Default Provisions in Venture Capital Limited Partnership Agreements, 98 CORNELL L.
REV. 1495, 1517 (2013) (noting “VC screening: staged investment deters low-quality
applicants from seeking funding because applicants know that even if they can fool an investor
in the first round of financing, they will likely not succeed at doing so in the later rounds. This
makes seeking funding marginally less attractive to low-quality applicants.”).
67. See, e.g., Yael Hochberg, Carlos J. Serrano, and Rosemarie Ziedonis, Patent
Collateral, Investor Commitment, and the Market for Venture Lending, TECHNICAL REPORT,
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, (2014); Yael Hochberg, Carlos J. Serrano, and
Rosemarie Ziedonis, Intangible but Bankable, 348 SCIENCE 1202 (2015).
68. See infra, notes 69 and 70; see generally Michael B. Heeley, Sharon F. Matusik, and
Neelam Jain, Innovation, Appropriability, and the Underpricing of Initial Public Offerings,
50 THE ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL 209-25 (2007); Ronald J. Mann & Thomas W.
Sager, Patents, Venture Capital, and Software Start-ups, 36 RESEARCH POLICY 193-208
(2007); Jerry Cao & Po-Hsuan Hsu, The Informational Role of Patents in Venture Capital
Financing, Technical Report (2011); Carolin Haussler, Dietmar Hargho, and Elizabeth
Muller, To Be Financed or Not . . . the Role of Patent for Venture Capital-Financing 1-47
(2009) http://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp09003.pdf [https://perma.cc/2BCE-W7DZ];
Annamaria Conti, Jerry Thursby, and Marie Thursby, Patents as Signals for Startup
Financing, 61 THE JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS 592-622 (2013); Annamaria Conti,
Marie Thursby, and Frank. Rothaermel, Show Me the Right Stuff: Signals for High-tech
Startups, 22 JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT STRATEGY 341-64 (2013); Gili
Greenberg, Small Firms, Big Patents? Estimating Patent Value Using Data on Israeli Startups’ Financing Rounds, 10 EUROPEAN MANAGEMENT REVIEW 183-96 (2013); David H. Hsu
& Rosemarie H. Ziedonis, Resources as Dual Sources of Advantage: Implications for Valuing
Entrepreneurial-firm Patents, 34 STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT JOURNAL 761-81 (2013); David
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importance of this patent filings signal to being only relevant for Series A
funding.69 With respect to embryonic and younger startups, however, patents
are not signals. The most credible indicators for seed and angel funding are
O2(U+*4U2*+ R,14 R1)2VU,:+ R,OU2V+ p2V Rp4OLjd 70 However, other scholars
have found no differentiation in the success of startups between those with
and without patents. 71
Numerous scholars have identified patents correlating with startup
success, calling this signaling, but did not provide any explanation of how
this signal would be credible or could serve as a separating signal or
equilibrium.72 Y1,U1(U,f *PU+U +*)VOU+ VOV 21* R1W)+ 12 op2M:+ LU2VO2Q *1
startups. They primarily focused on venture debts and funding by mostly
non-banks to startups.73
B. Audretsch, Werner Bante, and Prashanth Mahagaonkar, Financial Signaling by Innovative
Nascent Ventures: The Relevance of Patents and Prototypes, 41 RESEARCH POLICY 1407
(2012); Sebastian Hoenen, Christos Kolympiris, Wilfred Schoenmakers, and Nicholas
Kalaitzandonakes, The Diminishing Signaling Value of Patents Between Early Rounds of
Venture Capital Financing, 43 RESEARCH POLICY 956-89 (2014); Sudipto Bhattacharya & Jay
R. Ritter, Innovation and Communication: Signaling with Partial Disclosure, 50 THE REVIEW
OF ECONOMIC S TUDIES 331-46 (1983); Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. OF CHICAGO L. REV
625-79 (2002); Ronald J. Mann, Do Patents Facilitate Financing in the Software Industry?,
83 TEXAS L. REV. 961 (2005); David H. Hsu & Rosemarie H. Ziedonis, Patents as Quality
Signals for Entrepreneurial Ventures, 8 ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT ANNUAL MEETING
PROCEEDINGS 1-6 (2008); Iain M. Cockburn & Megan MaeGarvie, Research, Patents,
Thickets, and the Financing of Early-Stage Firms: Evidence from the Software Industry,
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH (2007); Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at
the Patent Office, 95 NORTHWESTERN U.L REV. 1495 (2001).
69. See generally Engel & Keilbach, supra note 66; Conti, Thursby, & Rothaermel, supra
note 68; Conti, Thursby, & Thursby, supra note 68; Greenberg, supra note 68; Hsu &
Ziedonis, supra note 68; Hoenen, Kolympiris, Schoenmakers, & Kalaitzandonakes, supra
note 68.
70. See Conti, Thursby, & Rothaermel, supra note 68.
71. See Daniel Hoenig & Joachim Henkel, Quality Signals? The Role of Patents,
Alliances, and Team Experience in Venture Capital Financing, 44 RESEARCH POLICY 104964 (2015).
72. See Lemley, supra note 68; M. Diane Burton, Jesper B Sorensen, and Chrisine M.
Beckman, Coming From Good Stock: Career Histories and New Venture Formation, IN
SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATIONS REVISITED, 229-62 (Emerald Group Publishing
Limited 2002); Baum & Silverman, supra note 66; Christine M. Beckman, M. Diane Burton,
and Charles O:Reilly, Early Teams: The Impact of Team Demography on VC Financing and
Going Public, 22 JOURNAL OF BUSINESS VENTURING 147-73 (2007); Engel & Keilbach, supra
note 68; Heeley, Matusik, and Jain, supra note 68; David H. Hsu, Experienced
Entrepreneurial Founders, Organizational Capital, and Venture Capital Funding, 36
RESEARCH POLICY 722-41 (2007); Hsu & Ziedonis, supra note 68; Mann & Sager, supra note
68, at 193-208; Paul A. Gompers, Anna Kovner, Josh Lerner, and David S. Scharfstein,
Performance Persistence in Entrepreneurship, 96 JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS 18-32
(2010); Hoenen, Kolympiris, Schoenmakers, and Kalaitzandonakes, supra note 68; Hoenig
& Henkel, supra note 71.
73. Mischa Hesse, Eva Lutz, and E. Talmor, Patent Activity of Start-ups and the
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Further, the exuberance of labeling patents as signal of startup success
has not yet reconciled how recent decisions from the Supreme Court will
have a negative impact on patents procurement by startups in biopharma/life
science, healthcare information, and software/internet sectors.
The
Prometheus and Myriad decisions relating to patentable subject matters have
imposed restrictions in patenting genes, novel drugs, and diagnostic
methods.74 The Alice decision overhauls the patenting of software business
method patents, causing companies in the software/internet industry to rely
on the weaker protection under trade secrets and copyrights. 75 Thus, the
impact of these decisions will cause startups in the relevant industries to no
longer have as robust a patent portfolio with which to indicate quality. 76
Other scholars have identified indicators like prominent
endorsements,77 alliances with prominent industry groups, 78 and team
experience,79 as highly correlated with startup success. But some scholars
have contradicted the indicators, revealing that they found team experience
did not correlate with the success of the startup. 80
In summary, though the scholars suggested signaling, none provided
analysis or models of incentive compatible support or separating equilibrium
Structuring of Venture Lending Contracts, 12 JOURNAL OF MODERN ACCOUNTING AND
AUDITING 410-28 (2016); Gaetan deRassenfosse & Timo Fischer, Venture Debt Financing:
Determinants of the Lending Decision, 10 STRATEGIC ENTREPRENEURSHIP JOURNAL 235-56
(2016); Audretsch & Mahagaonkar, supra note 68; Yael Hochberg, Carlos J. Serrano, and
Rosemarie Ziedonis, Patent Collateral, Investor Commitment, and the Market for Venture
Lending, TECHNICAL REPORT, NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, (2014); Yael
Hochberg, Carlos J. Serrano, and Rosemarie Ziedonis, Intangible but Bankable, 348 SCIENCE
1202 (2015).
74. Mayo v. Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012); Assoc. for Molecular Pathology v.
Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct. 1747 (2013).
75. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). James E. Daily,
Alice’s Aftermath: changes in Patentee Behavior Since Alice v. CLS Bank, 23 B.U. J. SCI. &
TECH. L. 284 (2017) (analyzing the impact of Alice in software patents and related industries).
76. Sanjesh P. Sharma, Patent-Eligible Subject Matter in Light of Mayo v. Prometheus,
24 INTEL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 9, 9 (2012) (stating that the Mayo decision is “the death knell
for patents relating to personalized medicine, diagnostics, and biotechnology.”); see Editorial,
Myriad Diagnostic Concerns, 31 NATURE BIOTECH. 571 (2013) (attributing the decrease in
investments in the diagnostic sectors is caused in part by the Myriad and Prometheus
decisions, and that they are “the death knell for diagnostic innovation”).
77. Toby E. Stuart, Ha Hoang, and Ralph C. Hybels, Interorganizational Endorsements
and the Performance of Entrepreneurial Ventures, 44 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 315 (1999); Hsu, supra
note 68; Hoenig & Henkel, supra note 71.
78. Stuart, Hoang, and Hybels, supra note 77; Baum & Silverman, supra note 66; Hoenig
& Henkel, supra note 71.
79. Burton, Sørensen, and Beckman, supra note 72; Long, supra note 68; Gompers,
Kovner, Lerner, and Scharfstein, supra note 72; Beckman, Burton, and O:Reilly, supra note
72; Hsu, supra note 68; Hsu & Ziedonis, supra note 68; Hoenig & Henkel, supra note 71;
Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined..
80. Baum & Silverman, supra note 66.
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support.
B. Patents as Signals in Venture Debts
Venture debts are loans provided by lenders to startups that have
already received VC funding rounds. 81 These lenders are typically nonbanks and therefore they are not subject to banking regulations. 82 With
respect to venture debts, several scholars have asserted that patents are strong
indicators for both venture debt lenders and banks to rely on in providing
debt financing to companies. 83
These scholars have demonstrated through surveys of samples of
mostly non-bank lenders that the presence of VC-backed capital funding
serves as a substitute for cash flows and patents for tangible collateral in
*PU+U LU2VU,+: VUWO+O12 O2 *PU Up,Lj +*pQU+ 1R *PU +*p,*)p.84 The scholars noted
venture lenders demand warrants and credit spread as part of the pricing for
*PU VUo*+f O2 pVVO*O12 *1 *pMO2Q p +UW),O*j O2*U,U+* O2 *PU +*p,*).:+ .p*U2*+d 85
Additionally, some scholars have indicated that average venture lenders
require 13.58 percent warrants and an eight percent credit spread. 86 These
are considerably higher rates for a much higher risk pool than what banks in
IP Venture Banking are targeting. 87 Y1,U1(U,f *PU +WP1Lp,+: U4.Pp+OiUV
81. See Patrick Gordan, Venture Debt: A Capital Idea for Startups, KAUFMAN FELLOWS
PRESS, https://www.kauffmanfellows.org/journal_posts/venture-debt-a-capital-idea-for-start
ups/ [https://perma.cc/HJ4W-DP5K] (“Venture debt is a form of debt financing for venture
equity-backed companies that lack the assets or cash flow for traditional debt financing, or
that want greater flexibility. . . venture debt is generally structured as a three-year term loan
(or series of loans).”).
82. Venture debt lenders are “private limited liability partnerships funded by pension
funds, institutional investors, and private investors”. Samuel A. Waxman & Jordan L.
Goldman, Venture Debt: An Attractive Tool for Startup Companies, PAUL HASTINGS (Feb. 2,
1027), https://www.paulhastings.com/publications-items/details/?id=226eeb69-2334-6428811c-ff00004cbded [https://perma.cc/MVT8-A2YF] (Feb. 02, 2017). On the other hand,
banks operate in “universally a regulated industry”. Takayuki Usui, Corporate Governance
of Banking Organizations in the United States and in Japan, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 563, 564
(2003) (“The importance of banks to national economies is underscored by the fact that
banking is virtually universally a regulated industry and that banks have access to government
safety nets.”).
83. Darian M. Ibrahim, Debt as Venture Capital, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1169 (2010);
Hoenen, Kolympiris, Schoenmakers, and Kalaitzandonakes, supra note 68; Hochberg,
Serrano, and Ziedonis, supra note 73; deRassenfosse & Fischer, supra note 73; Hesse, Lutz,
and Talmor, supra note 73.
84. See generally Ibrahim, supra note 83.
85. Hesse, Lutz, and Talmor, supra note 73; deRassenfosse & Fischer, supra note 73;
Ronald J. Mann, Secured Credit and Software Financing, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 134 (1999);
Ibrahim, supra note 83.
86. Hesse, Lutz, and Talmor, supra note 73.
87. See Part I (B), supra.
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patents as collateral are the key driver of the venture debts.88 Some have
even suggested that the only limitation in venture debts is patent valuation,
as the methodology for patent valuation is still too expensive. 89
Overall, several scholars indicated that venture lenders (mostly nonbanks mixed with banks) should use the presence of VC-backed Series A as
a signal of quality. 90 In parallel, studies have demonstrated that startups
backed by leading VCs tend to secure prestigious investment banks to
syndicate their IPOs. 91 Such startups reach IPO faster and earn greater
valuations at IPO compared to startup without connection to leading VCs.
Existing studies on patents as signals in venture debts, though helpful,
do not address what we are dealing with here: in the context of bank lending
to startups, what are the credible signals? We assert that the presence of VCbacked funding in Series A, implicit promises to fund Series B, and patents
are not credible signals for banks. These signals cannot serve as indicators
for banks to ascertain the likelihood that the startup will obtain additional
8! R)2VO2Q O2 *PU op2M+: VUWO+O12+ *1 LUnd to startups. Banks need better
signals, and we turn first to the background on signaling equilibrium theory
and model.
BACKGROUND ON SIGNALING EQUILIBRIUM MODEL THEORY
The seminal work on information signaling by Michael Spence, who
shared the Nobel Prize with Joseph Stiglitz and George Akerloff, paves the
way for new understanding on solving informational asymmetry. 92
@,1RU++1, \1P2 ?OLUj Pp+ ULUQp2*Lj +)44p,OiUV >.U2WU:+ m1,MB
Spence suggested that difficulties in observing human traits correlated

88. See generally Ibrahim, supra note 83; Yael Hochberg, Carlos J. Serrano, and
Rosemarie Ziedonis, Intangible but Bankable, 348 SCIENCE 1202 (2015).
89. Id.; deRassenfosse & Fischer, supra note 73.
90. deRassenfosse & Fischer, supra note 73; Ibrahim, supra note 83; R. J. Mann, supra
note 85; Paul Gompers & Josh Lerner, The Venture Capital Revolution, 15 THE JOURNAL OF
ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 145-68 (2001); Mitchell A. Petersen & Raghuram G. Rajan, The
Benefits of Lending Relationships: Evidence from Small Business Data, 49 THE JOURNAL OF
FINANCE 3-37 (1994); Scott Shane & Daniel Cable, Network Ties, Reputation, and the
Financing of New Ventures, 48 MANAGEMENT SCIENCE 364-81 (2002).
91. See Stuart, Hoang, and Hybels, supra note 77; Mann, supra note 85; Ibrahim, supra
note 83.
92. See generally Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Q. J. ECON. 355 (1973)
(outlining the signaling model and some of its conclusions by analyzing markets in which
signaling takes place and in which the primary signalers are relatively numerous). Spence
Lp*U, VURO2UV N1o 4p,MU* +OQ2pL+ “pW*O(O*OU+ 1, p**,Oo)*U+ 1R O2VO(OV)pL+ O2 p 4p,MU* mPOWPf oj
design or accident, alter the beliefs of, or convey information to, other individuals in the
4p,MU*d” YOWPpUL >.U2WUf Market Signaling: Informational Transfer in Hiring and Related
Screening Processes 1 (1974).
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with labor productivity, and in monitoring productivity, would result in an
equilibrium where wage offers were based on the educational credentials of
the job seeker. That is, firms would use education as a screening device to
sift out workers of lower productivity. As Spence emphasized, a crucial
precondition for such an equilibrium is that those with greater productivity
are also faster learners in school and hence have lower opportunity costs.
Given this assumption, higher productivity individuals, facing wage offers
contingent upon educational performance, find it in their interest to
accumulate higher credentials, and thereby provide a signal to potential
employers.93
Spence created a mathematical model to illustrate how signals can
reliably convey no verifiable information between parties based on their
conduct or commitments. 94 The model assumes that there are two types of
job applicants T the high-.,1V)W*O(O*j 1, “Q11V” *j.U p2V *PU L1m.,1V)W*O(O*j 1, “opV” *j.U T and that employers prefer high-productivity
types and will pay higher salaries to them, and that all job applicants desire
higher salaries.95 To secure the higher salary job, the applicants want
prospective employers to think that they are indeed the good types. 96 The
truly good types must convey reliable signals indicating they are good types
while the prospective employers must find a reliable way to separate good
from bad types.97 The Spence model illustrates that higher education
credential functions as a truth-telling signal, sepa,p*O2Q p..LOWp2*:+ *j.U+ O2
a job market.98
The Spence model also assumes that education is costly, that is,
obtaining an education requires substantial investment. 99 In addition, the
costs for education are differential: high for low-productivity applicant but
low for high-productivity applicant. 100 Due to the differential costs of
obtaining education, a high-productivity applicant invests in securing the
education, but not a low-productivity applicant (the cost is greater for the
low-productivity applicant to obtain the education so the applicant rationally
does not want to invest in having the education).101 In addition, prospective
employers believe that the education correlates with high productivity, and
thus they want to hire the applicant with the education.102 Consequently, the
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

John G. Riley, Information Equilibrium, 47 ECONOMETRICA 331, 331 (1979).
Spence, supra note 92.
Id. at 356-68.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 361-68.
Id. at 358.
Id. at 362.
Id.
Id.
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applicant with the education receives higher salary, enjoying the benefits
over the costs of investment in obtaining the education.
Spence showed that a signaling equilibrium can occur when the high
productivity applicant type effectively signals to the prospective employer
information about the true quality of the applicant type that the low
productivity applicant cannot duplicate. 103 >.U2WU:+ N1o 4p,MU*O2Q +OQ2pLO2Q
model can be separating, semi-pooling, or pooling equilibria, depending on
what market conditions are present. 104
Formally, in game theory relating to the issues of reputation from an
incomplete information and the signaling games, a pooling equilibrium
4Up2+ “p2 U-)OLOo,O)4 O2 mPOWP pLL *j.U+ 1R +U2VU, +U2V *PU +p4U
mes+pQUd” 105 A +U.p,p*O2Q U-)OLOo,O)4 O+ “p2 U-)OLOo,O)4 O2 mPOWP pLL *j.U+
1R +U2VU, +U2V VORRU,U2* 4U++pQU+d” 106 A semi-pooling or partial separating
U-)OLOo,O)4 4Up2+ “p2 U-)OLOo,O)4 O2 mPOWP +14U *j.U+ 1R +U2VU, +U2V *PU
same message, while some others send +14U 1*PU, 4U++pQU+d”107
>WP1Lp,+ Pp(U p..LOUV >.U2WU:+ +OQ2pLO2Q 41VUL O2 4p2j p,Up+d108 For
example, Stiglitz developed a signaling model to demonstrate that payment
of dividends is a credible signal of profitability to uninformed investors in
investment decisions.109 Because uninformed investors cannot separate good
investments from bad investments and cannot confirm which firms indeed
earn profits while all firms claim high-profit. Paying high dividends will
cost the truly high-profit company less but cost the low-profit company
more. A low-profit company cannot afford and does not want to pay the high
cost of paying high dividends. Therefore, paying dividends is a creditable
signal, effectively communicating to uninformed investors that the company
is indeed a high-profit one.110

103. Id. at 361-68.
104. See id. (explaining when there are different market conditions for education as a
signal in job market, different equilibria occur).
105. Muhamet Yildiz, 14.12 Game Theory Lecture Notes Reputation and Signaling, 8
http://web.mit.edu/14.12/www/02F_lecture_rep.pdf [https://perma.cc/UP8M-RYRC].
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See generally Russell D. Covey, Signaling and Plea Bargaining’s Innocence
Problem, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 73, (2009) 97-103 (summarizing the wide application of
Spence:s signaling mechanism).
109. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Information and Capital Markets, FINANCIAL ECONOMICS:
ESSAYS IN HONOR OF PAUL COOTNER 96 (Cathryn M. Cootner, Paul H. Cootner & William F.
Sharpe eds., 1982) (noting that uninformed investors view payment of dividend as a sign that
the company is making profit).
110. Likewise, others demonstrate on how warranties can function as a signal of quality.
Sanford J. Grossman, The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure About
Product Quality, J.L. & ECON. 461 (1981); George L. Priest, A Theory of the Consumer
Product Warranty, 90 YALE L.J. 1297 (1981).
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MODELING CREDITABLE SIGNAL IN VENTURE LENDING BY
BANKS
")OLVO2Q 12 >.U2WU p2V 1*PU,+: m1,M+ p2V O2+OQP*+ R,14 ]@ 8U2*),U
"p2MO2Qf mU W,Up*U 1), 41VULd =PU 41VUL OLL)+*,p*U+ *Pp* p2 U2*,U.,U2U),:+
costly efforts above and beyond essential fundraising, are credible signals
for banks to rely on in differentiating startups for venture loans. 111
We note that some scholars have demonstrated that patent filing as
signals because patents require a costly effort (or differential costs), that it
costs less for higher quality startups and more for lower quality startups. 112
Meeting Spence model requirements for a separating equilibrium, 113 the
scholars constructed a full model of the separating equilibrium.
Accordingly, patent filing can be a credible, truth-telling, costly effort signal
that is able to inform VCs to fund Series A to the startups.
Patent filing, however, is not reliable signal for banks in lending
decision to startups that have already received VC funding. Banks need to
have certainty of whether its loan will get paid by the startup due to statutory
and regulatory constraints in banking. The only way that the startup can pay
back the bank loan is when the startup receives an infusion of cash. That
cash infusion can only occur when the startup obtains additional rounds of
capital from VCs.114
7U 21m Uk.LpO2 1), 41VUL 1R U2*,U.,U2U),:+ W1+*Lj URR1,*+ .p,*OpL
separating signal in details. Please consult our proofs in the appendix. 115
A. Objective of the Bank
It is important to take a moment and step back to look at the overall
111. In more technical terms, we assert that the information asymmetry problem related
to bank lending to startups in the innovation economy sectors can be addressed through a
partial separating equilibrium created by a credible, truth-telling, costly effort signal
indicating the current health and outlook of a potential startup client.
112. See generally Conti, Thursby, & Rothaermel, supra note 68; Conti, Thursby, &
Thursby, supra note 68; Long, supra note 68. These models met Spence:s requirements.
Michael Spence, Competitive and Optimal Responses to Signals: An Analysis of Efficiency
and Distribution, 87 JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY 296-332 (1974) (showing that patent
filing can be interpreted as signals).
113. Id.
114. See generally Jay Acunzo, What Is Venture Debt and How Should Startups Use It?,
NEXTVIEW, (April 30, 2015) (demonstrating that cash injection from VC is required for startup
to pay back bank debt), https://nextviewventures.com/blog/what-is-venture-debt/ [https://per
ma.cc/G2GH-A84N].
115. The appendix is on file with the Authors.
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1oNUW*O(U PU,Ud "p2M+ +UUM *1 OVU2*ORj p2V LU2V *1 (pL)Ud A op2M:+ ,Ump,V
is repayment of the principal plus interest costs plus a risk premium – which
includes the potential profits or lossU+ ,URLUW*O2Q *PU -)pLO*j 1R *PU op2M:+
decision tools and the alternative sources of capital that its clients have. 116
The low cost of capital gives banks the competitive advantage. 117
Regulations and restrictions on the risk can disadvantage banks, although
these regulations also facilitate the low cost of capital. 118
Banks, in deciding whether to extend relatively low-cost venture loans
to startups, cannot tolerate the risk levels of higher-cost that non-bank
lenders can withstand. 119 Banks need to identify and only extend credit to
the higher quality and higher value startup clients. 120
B. Value Identification
Banks that limit themselves to traditional lending practices understand
that startups do not have established brick and mortar assets, inventory, or
cash flow.121 As noted, many scholars have emphasized the intellectual
property assets held by startups and recommended taking security interests
116. The risk premium benefits for venture banks are the inclusion of warrants in the
pricing of the loan. Ridgley, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. (“Venture debt is
markedly riskier when compared to cash flow lending. Addressing these risks strictly by
charging an appropriate risk-adjusted interest rate would consume too much of a young
company:s precious cash to make sense. Warrant pricing seeks to true up the risk/return
associated with venture debt while keeping debt payments manageable. Warrant pricing
reduces the cash cost of repaying the loan and provides potential upside for the lender.”).
117. Non-banks provide venture debts at higher prices compared to banks. Weyer, supra
note Error! Bookmark not defined. (stating that nonbanks charge “a higher overall cost of
capital” with “interest rates over 10%, upfront fees over 1%, and warrants over 5%”, and
banks charge a lower overall cost of capital with “interest rates at 4%-8%, upfront fees at
0.25%-0.50% and warrants at 3%-5%”).
118. Ridgley, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. (“Banks use deposits to fund
their lending activities. In exchange for access to this relatively cheap source of funds, banks
are heavily regulated in terms of the types of lending and the amount of risk they can take.
Debts funds, like venture capital firms, use equity invested by their shareholders or limited
partners to fund lending activity. This source of capital is subject to much less regulation, but
the cost is much higher.”).
119. Id.; Weyer, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. (noting that while nonbanks
do not require financial covenants, venture banks require financial covenants of “minimum
revenue at 75% plan, maximum net loss at 125% plan or minimum equity raise by a certain
date”).
120. Ridgley, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. (“Venture debt emphasizes the
borrower:s ability to raise additional capital to fund growth and repay the debt.”).
121. George W. Dent, Jr., Venture Capital and the Future of Corporate Finance, 70
WASH. U. L.Q. 1029, 1032-34 (1992) (“Loans are unavailable to most start-up and growth
companies because of the high risk of loss . . . . Moreover, few start-up companies generate
sufficient cash flow to service high interest charges. For these companies, such a loan would
rapidly lead to insolvency.”).
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in patents and other IP. 122 However, we are proposing that the value of the
startup is not limited to discrete patents. Rather, the intellectual property
value of the startup is tied to the realization of the enterprise value of its IP
through the implementation of an ongoing viable business. 123 Banks enjoy
this value in the form of demanding warrants in the pricing of the venture
loan.124 "p2M+ Uk*U2V *PU (U2*),U L1p2+ *1 +*p,*).+ op+UV 12 *PU +*p,*).:+
enterprise value. For a startup between Series A and Series B rounds of
funding, the Series A round has already assessed the enterprise value. Here
is an illustration:
If a Series A round of $10 million provides the new investor with 20
percent ownership (on a fully diluted basis), then the stake held by the
existing shareholders is valued at $50 million. Assume the company has a
monthly cash burn of $1 million, meaning the Series A proceeds provide a
10-month runway. A venture debt loan of $3 million in this scenario might
require warrants with dilution equivalent to 25-50 basis points (fully diluted).
In this example, the venture debt would extend the operating runway by
another three months. The venture debt loan provides roughly 30 percent
additional runway but carries only 1/40th the dilution, even with a 50-bps
warrant in the pricing. 125
To minimize their exposure, banks are primarily interested in lending
to startups between VC rounds.126 Thus, we focus on startups between Series
A and Series B rounds where the enterprise value is determined by the prior
and next rounds of funding. This analysis is also applicable to other later
funding rounds as well as late growth companies wishing to expand into
newly identified markets, since the enterprise value also depends on the last
122. See generally Ibrahim, supra note 83; Hochberg, Serrano and Ziedonis, Intangible
but Bankable, 348 SCIENCE 1202 (2015).
123. See supra Part I (B) (discussing warrants). See also SVB presentation on file with the
authors.
124. See supra Part I (B).
125. Ridgley, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., Ridgley, supra note Error!
Bookmark not defined., and Anderson, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. (noting
that venture debt is 20-35% of the most recent equity round and provides an additional three
to nine months of runway.).
126. Jay Acunzo, What is Venture Debt and How Should Startups Use It? NEXT VIEW
VENTURES : VENTURE DEBT 101 (Apr. 30, 2015), https://nextviewventures.com/blog/what-isventure-debt/d _LU2 YULL1:+ Uk.Lp2p*O12 1R mPj (U2*),U L1p2+ 1WW), oU*mUU2 8! ,1)2V+ O+
inst,)W*O(UB “r]q* 1R*U2 Pp..U2+ mPU2 p W14.p2j O+ R,U+P 1RR 1R p2 U-)O*j ,pO+Uf )+)pLLj mO*PO2
*P,UU 1, R1), 412*P+d =PU ,Up+12 O* Pp..U2+ *PO+ mpj O+ *Pp*f pQpO2f *PU,U:+ p o)j-in from all
the parties. . d d `1, *PU O2(U+*1,+f *PU,U:+ p .Lp2 *PUj N)+* O2(Usted in. For the founding team,
*PU,U:+ p +*,p*UQj O2 .LpWUd A2V *PU2 *PU -)U+*O12 oUW14U+f “^1m V1 ] W14.LU4U2* *PU Wp.O*pL
] N)+* ,pO+UVf UO*PU, *1 o)j 41,U *O4U O2 Wp+U ] +LO. 1, *1 pWWULU,p*U 4j +.U2VO2Q OR *#” 8U2*),U
debt gives you those options, and particularly for companies that wind up doing well, then on
your same cash-1)* Vp*Uf j1):V LOMULj Pp(U pWPOU(UV p oU**U, 4OLU+*12U *Pp2M+ *1 R)ULO2Q j1)
+.U2Vf mPOWP m1)LV *,p2+Lp*U O2*1 p oU**U, (pL)p*O12d” Id.
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and next rounds of VC funding or a valuation event. 127
Therefore, since it is the next round that will pay the bank, the bank
must rely on signals to determine the likelihood that the startup will be able
to obtain additional future rounds of VC funding in deciding whether to lend
to the startup.
C. Signals
In venture lending, the bank will assess data for variables that correlate
strongly with the most desirable outcome: a successful startup reaching a
realized valuation as a high return acquisition or initial public offering. 128
When making a lending decision to a startup that just received Series A
R)2VO2Qf *PU op2M RpWU+ *PU -)U+*O12 1R “]+ this a higher or lower quality
+*p,*).#”
The key determinant is Series B venture funding. Without it, the startup
will plunge off the cash-burn runway into liquidation. If there is a VC firm
or, even better, two VC firms, one inside VC and one outside VC, interested
in funding Series B, this will be highly correlated with the success of Series
B and the continuation of the startup towards realized valuation. 129 Two VCs
can examine and determine the enterprise business fundamentals and
execution to be investment worthy. Furthermore, two VCs are likely to
increase funds to the startup as well as enhance contacts, expertise, and
guidance.130
127. The venture loan amounts change significantly between early stage, expansion stage,
p2V Lp*U +*pQUB “`1, Up,Lj +*pQU W14.p2OU+ hOdUdf .,U-revenue, Series A-B), lenders will
typically commit 25%-50% of debt relative to the last round of equity (e.g., $1,000,000$2,000,000 of debt for a Company that recently raised a $4,000,000 Series A). Expansion
stage companies (i.e., post-revenue, Series C-D) may be able to obtain upwards of $7,500,000
of debt. Later stage companies (i.e., early profitability, Series E+) typically garner as much
debt as collateral coverage or cash flow can support (similar to middle market lending, but
venture lenders generally provide it sooner than others).”
Weyer, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.. Likewise, the loan terms differ based on
the company stage, as expectations of what the company must achieve as it matures change.
See Ridgley, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined..
128. The ultimate prize of the loan pricing is for the bank to cash in on the warrant when
the firm reaches IPO. See supra Part I (B). Having a lion:s share of clients reaching IPO is
a bragging right for outlier banks in venture banking. See Get to Know Us, SILICON VALLEY
BANK, https://www.svb.com/newsroom/facts-at-a-glance/ [https://perma.cc/H6VW-5E2J]
(last visited Sept. 25, 2018).
129. Ridgley, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. (noting that the leading bank in
IP Venture Banking states that they focus “on the probability and the capacity of the existing
<inside: investors to independently close one or more follow-on rounds, should the company
prove unable to attract a new <outside: investors.”).
130. See, e.g., Mira Ganor, Improving the Legal Environment for Start-Up Financing By
Rationalizing Rule 144, 33 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1447, 1448 (2007) (noting that VCs
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Can banks trust the VCs for reliable signal? One scholar has argued
that once the VC round of funding occurs, venture loan will soon follow
because VCs make an implicit promise to repay the loan with the present and
future investments. 131 !12*,p,j *1 *PU +WP1Lp,:+ p++U,*O12f *PU V),poOLO*j 1R
any implicit promise is tenuous because VCs continually update their
funding evaluation based on new performance information about the
startup.132 Due to the high rate of failure in between each VC round, there is
p POQP .,1opoOLO*j *Pp* *PU 8!:+ U(pL)p*O12 1R *PU +*p,*). mOLL WPp2QUd =PO+
change is indistinguishable from untruthful behavior, and there is no legal
contract guaranteeing this implicit promise. For all these reasons, the
implicit promise is akin to cheap talk. 133 In other words, using reputation in
mentor and monitor their portfolio companies, offer assistance and provide access to
expertise).
131. See Ibrahim, supra note 83, at 1184.
132. For example, not all startups with Series A funding advance to Series B. Only half
makes it to Series B. That means VCs abandon their investments when the startups fail to
meet expectations. In fact, Series B is “the most challenging” stage for startups to survive to
Series B. See Tomasz Tunguz, The Challenges of Raising Your Series B, http://tomtunguz.
com/challenges-of-the-series-b/ [https://perma.cc/VC8H-C6M3] (May 14, 2018); Maddy
Suresh, Series B Funding%Why Raising It Is Difficult?, THE TECH BULLETIN, (Dec. 28, 2015),
https://www.thetechbulletin.com/series-b-33488/ [https://perma.cc/4LHM-53ES]. Likewise,
Fred Destin explains why Series B is the hardest for startups to advanceB “When you to go
raise your Series B, you:ve driven burn up as you needed to fully staff engineering (these
damned “enterprise” RUp*),U+. . . ), start hiring a commercial team that takes its time scaling,
get a few hires wrong usually to top it off and have hired a full layer of VP:s to show that you
have the basis for scale. This makes the company particularly fragile. Your revenue numbers
are low, you:re dripping a ton of red ink and show a plan reliant on achieving serious revenue
progress right when you:re about to run low on cash. There are no excuses for not having a
rock solid execution plan, because that:s usually all you have. . . . Series B is usually that
painful phase when you are “Building” team and product (i.e. spending a lot of money
industrializing your company) but are still quite a ways away from Scale. So there you have
it: a tough risk profile, a tough financial plan, and a lukewarm funding market. Series B in
my experience truly separates the boys from the men in terms of fundraising ability.”
Fred Destin, Why Series B is Usually the Hardest, (Mar. 31, 2014), http://freddestin.com/20
14/03/raising-series-hardest.html [https://perma.cc/6LDQ-SG6A]. Moreover, firms with
Series B funding don:t automatically receive Series C funding. See Sonya Mann, Series C and
Beyond: How Growth Investing Is Different, MATTERMARK, (Dec. 8, 2016), https://matterma
rk.com/series-c-versus-series-growth-investing-different/
[https://perma.cc/72H2-Y6J2].
“Investment firms don:t compose their investment portfolios at random; they will keenly
scrutinize a startup:s progress and evaluate its future chances. Every step on the venture
capital ladder has different requirements. . . . To get an investor to write you a Series A check,
you need a solid product. To make it to Series B, the company will have to display real
traction. To survive to their C round, a solid business is required. Later rounds of capital need
all of the above, plus flourishing metrics.”
133. Talk is cheap and cannot be a signaling device. Low-quality sellers can always brag
that “my product is the best” and that talking signal is not credible. Credible signal is costly
and low-quality sellers cannot easily replicate. See generally George A. Akerlof, The Market
for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488 (1970)
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soliciting truthfulness is not reliable when about half the startups are
expected to fail.
In this case, even if there are two VCs considering participation in
Series B funding, an insider and an outsider, their response to questions
about the likelihood of participating in Series B may well change if this is
the criterion used by the bank to extend a loan. Unfortunately, because inside
VCs are already a part owner in the startup, they have an incentive to
encourage the loan. As the success of the startup, and thus the success of the
inside 8!:+ 1m2U,+PO. +*pMUf O+ W12*O2QU2* 12 the startup receiving
pVVO*O12pL R)2V+f *PU 8! Pp+ p2 O2WU2*O(U *1 U2W1),pQU *PU op2M:+ LU2VO2Qf
,UQp,VLU++ 1R *PU 8!:+ p++U++4U2* 1R *PU W14.p2jd ZOMUmO+Uf *PU outside
VCs are considering ownership in the high-risk startup. To the extent that
their risk can be reduced when time reveals more information about the
success or failure of the startup, the outside VC has an incentive to encourage
the venture bank loan to extend the time on the cash burn runway, allowing
for a later, more informed start of SeriU+ " R)2VO2Qd AQpO2f *PU 8!:+ *pLM O+
cheap.
The above scenarios demonstrate that if endogenous variables
determined by the actions in an environment suddenly become linked to a
decision that significantly changes the rewards for the participants in that
U2(O,124U2*f *PU (p,OpoLU+: pW*O12+ 4pj pL+1 WPp2QU p+ *PUO, O2WU2*O(U+
change. Thus, finding a variable that correlates with success is insufficient
to identify a valid signal that can be used for decisions without potentially
distorting the validity of a signal. The interactive structure of the market will
distort the informational content, if any, of the potential signal. 134 There is
no veracity in a cheap talk weak signal.
The lack of veracity in the signal does not mean that the success of the
startup is not strongly correlated with having two VCs interested in
participating in Series B funding. It might just be that this is the wrong signal
for an event that still contains valuable information.
Consider the origin of this correlated factor – how do two VCs become
O2*U,U+*UV O2 >U,OU+ " R)2VO2Q# !LUp,Ljf *PU 8!+: O2*U,U+* +*U4+ R,14 *PU
characteristics of the startup and the actions of the entrepreneur and
employees of the startup, which can be broken into two actions by the
entrepreneur. The first necessary action for the continuation of any startup
is to obtain at least one source of funding for the next Series B funding.
Without this funding, any startup on the cash burn runway would end. The
second decision will be either to continue expending resources on additional
fundraising even though the runway is well stocked or to allocate more

(exploring the various ways that consumers judge quality).
134. Spence, supra note 112.
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resources to development.
D. First Implicit VC Commitment to Series B
With respect to Series B funding, some startups will be better at
fundraising, and an important factor correlating with the ease of fundraising
will be the quality of the intellectual property enterprise value they are
selling. However, some startups may have rich inside VCs whose capacity
can fund both Series A and Series B. 135 Because they are 12 *PU +*p,*).:+
Board and continually monitoring and mentoring the startup to protect their
Series A investment, these inside VCs are the most knowledgeable and most
susceptible to fundraising if the VCs still have the capacity. Not all startups
will be in this favorable position. Thus, despite the negative correlation
between fundraising ability and quality of the startup, the effort required for
R)2V,pO+O2Q *PU RO,+* 8!+: W144O*4U2* *1 >U,OU+ " R)2VO2Q mOLL oU -)O*U
variable and will be related to the circumstances of the VCs and not just
related to the quality of the startup. Inside VC fundraising will generally be
easier, while outside VC fundraising will generally be harder.136
E. Second Implicit VC Commitment to Series B
A second VC commitment to Series B funding is originated by the
startup making an allocation of resource decisions. All startups are
extremely resource constrained and will need to make strategic decisions
about the allocation of resources and expenditure on their remaining cash
runway.
The choice is between continuing to expend resources on additional
fundraising or to invest these resources elsewhere in the company. The
startup must decide whether to gain a second VC commitment to Series B
funding, even though the runway is well-stocked. For high-quality startups,
this fundraising will take less effort than for low-quality startups. The
135. See Ridgley, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. (stating that banks in
venture lending “focus their underwriting on the probability and the capacity of the existing
<inside: investors to independently close one or more follow-on rounds, should the company
prove unable to attract a new <outside: investors.”).
136. Acunzo, supra note 114. For the venture banks, their typical process for a venture
loan emphasizes the probability that a company will attract outside VCsB “We:ll also dig into
the model, dig into the product, dig into their go-to-market, and really try to understand and
evaluate the milestones associated with getting to their next round of funding. These are
value-creation milestones. We:re essentially looking to understand the probability of a
company attracting more outside capital. If they can:t, then we want to know more about the
existing investor syndicate, so we:re not the only ones at the table.”
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alternative is to allocate more resources to development. Allocating
additional resources to development could provide more assurance of
meeting the next development milestone (a condition that must be met in
order to receive the next series of funding).
This is precisely the choice of action and costly signal, with signaling
cost negatively correlated with the desired quality, which is described by
Spence where there exists a family of separating equilibria reward (wage)
functions.137 This family of equilibria defines partial separating equilibria.
Let us further examine the choice of low- and high-quality startups.
F. Low Quality Startups
Lower quality startups will be in need of development results. Thus,
they will value the benefits of development. Fundraising efforts will require
more resources for a low-quality startup, as VCs are attracted to and
knowledgeable of how to use due diligence to distinguish higher quality from
lower quality startups. 138
Low-quality startups will need to devote more time to developing
o)+O2U++ R)2Vp4U2*pL+d ]2 1,VU, *1 4pO2*pO2 *PU O4.LOWO* 8!:+ W144O*4U2*
to Series B funding that the startup has already secured, the startup must meet
the business and development milestones. 139 Misallocating would hasten
liquidation.140 There is little benefit to a second commitment if it jeopardizes
the continuation of the startup.
G. High Quality Startups
Higher quality startups will be able to meet milestone deadlines. The
more attractive and higher quality the startup, the easier it will be to attract
VCs. Thus, the fundraising will require less costly effort for higher quality
+*p,*).+d _pO2O2Q 41,U 8!+: O2*U,U+* p2V W144O*4U2* early for Series B is
about investing in the future of the company before it is necessary to do so.
The startup will benefit from having a more assured, diverse VC funding
base with additional funds as well as the benefits from unlocking access to a
venture loan from banks.

137. Id.; Spence, supra note 112.
138. See Andrew A. Schwartz, The Digital Shareholder, 100 MINN. L. REV. 609, 644
(2015) (stating that geographic proximity enhances VCs: ability to conduct due diligence and
respond to uncertainty in monitoring their investments in startups).
139. Ibrahim, supra note 83, at 1184.
140. Id.
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H. Separating
A+ O2 >.U2WU:+ N1o 4p,MU* +OQ2pLO2Q .p.U,+f *PU po1(U VUWO+O12 .,1WU++
by startups meets the incentive compatibility constraints where the optimal
behaviors for high and low-quality startups are different. 141 Further, the
signal is incentive compatible and elicits truth-telling; each type – high and
low – prefers the outcome where they signal their own type. Therefore, they
would not benefit from imitating the other type.
Can a bank use this as a loan decision signal? Although using a signal
will alter the behavior generating the signal, it is precisely this type of costly
effort signal with signaling cost that is negatively correlated with the desired
quality which is described by Spence, where there exists a family of
separating equilibria reward (wage) functions. 142 This discrete family of
equilibria also composes partial separating equilibria of continuous abilities.
=PU UkO+*O2Q 8! +*p,*).:+ O2*U,pW*O12 O+ 12U 1R *PU 4U4oU,+ 1R *PO+ Rp4OLj 1R
separating equilibria. Adding the additional rewards of a potential venture
op2M L1p2 mOLL WPp2QU *PU .p,*OWO.p2*+: oUPp(O1,d ^1mU(U,f p+ *PU,U O+ p
family of separating equilibria functions, the bank will attempt to add this
reward of a loan in a way that still results in maintaining a partial separating
equilibrium. The nature of the new incentive structure with the addition of
the bank loan (that is not too large) will slightly shift the equilibria quality
cutoff between what determines which startups join the high-quality and the
low-quality pools.
There will be some nuances to verify that a second funding commitment
for Series B funding and the effort behind it is not a disguised effort to find
a primary commitment for Series B funding, but there are distinguishing
RUp*),U+d =PU op2M Wp2 ,U-)U+* p2V U(pL)p*U O2R1,4p*O12 po1)* *PU +*p,*).:+
efforts to gain funding from both the entrepreneur and VCs. Depending on
the quality of the VC firms that the entrepreneurs give their sales pitch to,
there is an expectation that the higher quality startups need less effort to
obtain a sale at each quality level of VC firms. If there is a long hard process
to obtain an outside commitment from a lower level VC firm, an existing
inside investor commitment may not be very credible.
Additionally, successfully obtaining an outside commitment from a
top-ranking VC firm may be a very strong indicator of quality. Even if the
inside VCs are unable to make commitments as they reach the end of their
current funds, their decline is not V)U *1 *PU +*p,*).:+ -)pLO*jd ;L*O4p*ULjf
*PO+ W1+*Lj U2*,U.,U2U),:+ URR1,* +U.p,p*O2Q +OQ2pL mOLL oU *PU +*,12QU+*f 41+*
recent information the bank will be able to obtain without exerting a too

141. Id.; Spence, supra note 112.
142. Spence, supra note 112.
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costly, more exhaustive due diligence investigation. 143
BEYOND THEORY: EVIDENCE FROM OUTLIER BANKS IN IP
VENTURE LENDING
Our signaling model does not reside in the theoretical realm. Concrete
evidence supporting the model is available. Outlier banks have been
providing capital to startups in the form of venture loans. With the lower
cost loans, the startup continues its growth acceleration before its next round
of capital funding from VCs. The outlier banks reap the benefits of the
+*p,*).:+ 2Uk* ,1)2V 1R 8! R)2VO2QB Pp(O2Q *PU L1p2 ,U.pOVf W1LLUW*O2Q
interest payments, and cashing in on the warrant based on the upswing
(pL)p*O12 1R *PU +*p,*).:+ U2*U,.,O+Ud 144 The leaders among outlier banks
include Silicon Valley Bank (SVB), Square 1 Bank, and CommericA. 145
As one of the top commercial banks in the United States, SVB has long
separated itself from the traditional banking practices. 146 SVB has
strategically rooted its branches in all technologically innovative centers
across the United States. 147 Since its inception in 1983, SVB has been
providing loans to more than 30,000 startups. The Bank boldly dedicates six
percent of its loan portfolio to startups. 148 Its success in IP Venture lending
is the envy among outlier banks. SVB counts fifty percent of all VC-backed
companies in the tech and life sciences as clients in its lending portfolio. 149
Also, it counts fifty percent of all U.S. VC-backed with an IPO in 2017 as
clients.150 The bank currently has fifty-one billion dollars in assets, extends
twenty-three billion dollars in loans to high-growth companies, and takes
$105 billion in deposits and investments. 151
Contrary to academic literature espousing the important role of patents
143. Our proofs support our model illustrating that the entrepreneur:s costly efforts
beyond the necessary fundraising all startups must do are credible signals for banks to rely on
in screening startups for the IP Venture loans. A copy of our proofs is on file with the Authors.
144. See Acunzo, supra note 114 (reporting on Silicon Valley Bank:s venture debt
business model).
145. See supra note Error! Bookmark not defined..
146. See generally Silicon Valley Bank Oral History Panel Robert “Bob” Medearis and
Roger Smith, COMPUTER HISTORY MUSEUM CHM REFERENCE NO. X7274.2015, (Nov. 11,
2014) (discussing the origins of SVB as having a unique technology focus) (a copy of the
transcription is on file with the authors).
147. See Reckard, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. (reporting that SVB has
offices in twenty-seven technology centers in the United States, in addition to offices in
London, Beijing, Shanghai and Herzliya Pituach, a neighborhood near Tel Aviv).
148. Facts at a Glance, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined..
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
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p+ W1LLp*U,pL O2 (U2*),U VUo*f >8":+ WLOU2*+ Pp(U (U,j RUm .p*U2*+d `1,
example, SVB has recorded only 626 total patents as collateral with the
USPTO for all deals with IP assets in 2016. 152 That modest total patents
number represents seventy-one deals, yielding a ratio of 8.8 patents for each
deal.153 =Pp* 4Up2+ >8":+ WLOU2*+ p,U 41+*Lj +*p,*).+ 1, POQP Q,1m*P
companies, and these companies are not the established, mature corporations
with large patent portfolios. Most importantly, SVB does not require
(pL)p*O12 1R *PU WLOU2*:+ O2*ULLUW*)pL .,1.U,*j p++U*+d AQpO2f *PO+ )21,*P1V1k
practice is contrary to the assertion that valuation of patent and valuation
methodology are necessary for banking on patents. 154
While SVB does not require valuation of the star*).:+ O2*ULLUW*)pL
property assets, the Bank pays more attention to the intellectual property as
a key driver of the enterprise value. 155 That means the Bank will conduct due
diligence and leverage its knowledge about the startup and its relationship
with VCs to determine whether the Bank is likely to reap the benefits of the
+*p,*).:+ U2*U,.,O+U (pL)U mPU2 *PU +*p,*). UkO*+ *P,1)QP +)o+U-)U2*
acquisition or IPO. 156 The Bank wants to seize the right to purchase equity
in the startup at the time it makes loans to the startup, so it can later cash in
12 *PU mp,,p2* *1 .),WPp+U *PU +*p,*).:+ +*1WMd 157 In other words, the Bank
)2VU,+*p2V+ *Pp* *PU +*p,*).:+ O2*ULLUW*)pL .,1.U,*j p++U*+ pL12U p,U 21* *Pp*
(pL)poLU o)* p+ *PU MUj V,O(U,+ 1R *PU +*p,*).:+ U2*U,.,O+U (alue, are worth
much more when there are later rounds of VC funding, acquisition, or IPO. 158
152. USPTO patent collateral filing data is on file with the authors.
153. Id.
154. See generally deRassenfosse & T.Fischer, supra note 73 (arguing that providing
patents as collateral is as important as providing tangible assets to lenders); Yael Hochberg,
Carlos J. Serrano, and Rosemarie Ziedonis, Intangible but Bankable, 348 SCIENCE 1202
(2015) (discussing the active market for intangibles such as patents for venture lenders in
certain sectors); Ibrahim, supra note 83 (finding that IP can function as a substitute for
tangible collateral).
155. A copy of SVB:s presentation is on file with the authors.
156. See Acunzo, supra note 114; Reckard, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined..
157. Examples of warrants issued by SVB:s clients for the benefit of SVB are abundant.
See Warrant to Purchase Stock from Xoom Corporation issued to Sillicon Valley Bank, SEC,
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar
/data/1315657/000119312513010596/d364901dex45.htm [https://perma.cc/LHN7-CQVC];
Warrant to Purchase Stock from 3Pardata, Inc. issued to SVB for 53,187 shares at $0.94 per
share and June 30, 2015 as the expiration date, https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/140
8501/000119312507207554/dex1022.htm [https://perma.cc/AN7H-Y8QS]; Warrant to
Purchase Stock from Alphatech Holdings, Inc. for 190,476 shares at $1.89 per share and Dec.
5, 2018 as the expiration date. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1350653/000
119312509044992/dex43.htm [https://perma.cc/4W3Q-466V].
158. Illustratively, SVB received the warrant to purchase stock issued by Xoom
Corporation for 100,000 shares at $1.71 per share, as part of the loan pricing to Xoom on
April 30, 2012. Three years later, Paypal acquired Xoom at $25 per share in cash in 2015.
See Ryan Mac, PayPal to Acquire Digital Money Transfer Company Xoom Before eBay Split,
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Illustratively, SVB received the warrant to purchase stock issued by
Xoom Corporation, a digital payment services firm, for 100,000 shares at
$1.71 per share, as part of the loan pricing to Xoom on April 30, 2012. 159 At
the time of the loan, Xoom had no patent issued in its name. The startup had
filed only one patent application in 2009 and which was still pending in the
USPTO.160 Xoom obviously possessed other proprietary assets like trade
secrets and copyrights related to its digital payment services. Three years
later, Paypal acquired Xoom at $25 per share in cash in 2015. 161 >8":+
warrant constituted a handsome return on the loan, in addition to the
origination fee, interest and principal repayments.
Moreover, Silicon Valley Bank typically conducts the following in its
venture lending to startups: 162
1. Understand that technology companies develop IP as key business
operation, model, and strategy, and the IP is the primary driver of the
enterprise value. The enterprise has identified unmet needs and utilizes the
IP/innovation to meet them in very creative ways, leading to disrupting the
existing sector/industry or creating a new one.
2. !12V)W* *PU *j.OWpL op2M:+ V)U Viligence, including cash flow and
collateral assessment, competitive landscape, barriers to entry, regulatory
risk, revenue concentrations, operating performance, amount/structure of
other debt, and overall financial health and ability to survive business
disruption.
3. ;2VU,+*p2V p2V p++U++ *PU U2*,U.,U2U),:+ opWMQ,1)2V p2V
Uk.U,OU2WU *1 Qp)QU *PU LOMULOP11V 1R +)WWU++d ;2VU,+*p2V O2(U+*1,+: h8!:+g
expectations of enterprise milestones, IP development, revenue growth, and
profits.
4. Know (form relationship, networking with) the players in the
U2*U,.,O+U:+ O2V)+*,jf O2WL)VO2Q 8!+f *UWP UkUW)*O(U+f W14.U*O*1,+f 1*PU,
entrepreneurs, and companies in the industry.
FORBES, (Jul. 1, 2015), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ryanmac/2015/07/01/paypal-acquiresdigital-money-transfer-company-xoom-before-ebay-split/#283a2bf82663
[https://perma.cc/7KJG-KJH8] (demonstrating how SVB:s warrant constituted a handsome
return on the loan).
159. See Warrant to Purchase Stock Issued to Silicon Valley Bank, supra note 157.
160. The application later matured to patent 8,688,550 granted on April 1, 2014.
161. Mac, supra note 158.
162. See Reckard, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. (explaining how SVB is
different from other banks in its relationship with startups and VCs, making SVB a “part
lender, part consultant, part cheerleader and part investor”, a “nursemaid to startups” and
“banking the venture capitalists who fund them”); Acunzo, supra note 114 (reporting an
interview with Glen Mello, Managing Director of Silicon Valley Bank Boston office and
explaining SVB:s venture lending business model); Ridgley, supra note Error! Bookmark
not defined.; Weyer, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.. SVB Presentation on file
with the authors.
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5. Y12O*1, *PU U2*U,.,O+U:+ ]@ VU(UL1.4U2*d
Y12O*1,
commercialization/milestone achievement, including client growth, and
product or service adoption, among others.
6. Assess the likelihood the company can obtain outside VC
investment. Assess the probability and capacity of inside VCs to provide
additional rounds, if the company cannot obtain outside VC funding.
7. ;2VU,+*p2V p2V p++U++ ]@:+ )2O-)U p2V VURU2+OoLU RUp*),U+ *Pp*
would attract potential purchasers in the event the bank must foreclose.
Knowledge and relationship in #4 are also useful in liquidation. 163
8. Structure the loan deal, pricing, and warrant.
A(U,pLLf >8":+ (U2*),U LU2VO2Q o)+O2U++ pW*O(O*OU+f p+ VU+W,OoUV O2
items 1-8 above, is consistent with our partial separating equilibrium model.
Our model indicates that the Bank should be observing the fundraising
capability and behavior of the startup in determining the likelihood the
startup would be able to obtain additional rounds of VC funding. Moreover,
our model is also consistent with prior empirical studies showing that lending
success is correlated with Series B venture capital funding.164 We have
expanded on this indicator by finding an incentive compatible costly effort
truth telling signal in the fundraising efforts of startups.
Clearly, Silicon Valley Bank has beat its competitors for many years in
its ability to discern and observe updated signal through its in-depth
knowledge and relationship with venture capitalists, tech executives,
entrepreneurs, clients, former clients, academics, researchers, and other
players in innovation economy sectors. 165 We certainly do not expect the
6,000 banks to replicate Silicon Valley Bank. We do hope that some of the
banks will.
CONCLUSION
Outlier banks operating in the inherently risky area of IP Venture
Banking have developed lending practices to leverage the intellectual
property as key drivers of enterprise value. Reaping the benefits of the
enterprise value at later valuation events, the banks require warrants as part
of the back-loaded loan pricing. Our signaling model with partial separating

163. An example of how SVB leveraged its relationship in liquidation is in the facts of
Sky Techs. LLC v. SAP AG, 576 F.3d 1374, 1376-78 (Fed. Cir. 2009). See also Reckard,
supra note 38 (discussing how SVB was able to recover on its security interest in the patents
by selling its right to a third party who then foreclosed on the patents and sold the patents at
public auction).
164. See generally Ibrahim, supra note 83.
165. See Facts at a Glance, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.; see also Reckard,
supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.; Acunzo, supra note 114.
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equilibria demonstrates how the banks address information asymmetry
problems by relying on a truth telling signal in assessing the likelihood the
potential borrowers can obtain subsequent rounds of capital funding. Based
on our model, perhaps some of the 6,000 banks would soon embrace lending
to the innovation economy sectors and unlock patents and other intellectual
property assets as key drivers of the enterprise value.

